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INTRODUCTION
In most segments of the economy there can be found differences in the quality of
goods that different groups of people buy or receive. Usually there is little, if any,
concern over such quality differentiation. Health care is an exception, since public
policy and provider ethics promote the idea that all consumers have an entitlement
to the highest quality of care available. Thus, finding deliberate quality discrimina-
tion and how it occurs would be an important issue for policy makers who wish to
discourage and prevent such behavior.
The basis for such concerns is not without merit. Despite moral and legal con-
trols, problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information, combined with pay-
ment systems designed to control costs, offer ample incentives for quality discrimina-
tion in health care. Moreover, quality discrimination in health care may be difficult
to substantiate due to the lack of a consensus in defining exactly what is meant by
“quality” [Feldstein, 1967].
Quality responses to cost controls are known as “cost-adjustment” in the litera-
ture. Although well documented theoretically, there have been few empirical studies
to date. Dranove and White [1998], using service intensity as a proxy for quality,
examined a sample of California hospitals to determine whether changes in Medi-
care or Medicaid reimbursement had a significant impact on the service intensity
provided to different groups of patients. While they found overall cost adjusting, there650 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
was no significant evidence to suggest quality discrimination – the change in service
intensity was uniform across patient groups.1 Friesner [2003] and Rosenman and
Friesner [2002] also found evidence of cost adjusting, but did so with a model that
assumed quality discrimination. Gertler [1988; 1989] and Gertler and Waldman [1992]
examined whether nursing homes cost adjust, assuming away quality discrimina-
tion. Dor and Farley [1996] investigated whether general hospitals cost adjusted, but
also assumed no quality discrimination.
Thus, there is not yet a general analysis in the literature about whether or not
health care providers practice quality discrimination, most notably based on the type
of insurance a patient carries. Most empirical studies simply assume that a provider
either does or does not quality discriminate. The goal of this paper is to test whether
health providers use quality/service intensity to practice market segmentation/dis-
crimination based on the type of insurance a person carries in a more general envi-
ronment of excess capacity.
The remainder of this paper proceeds in four steps. First, we discuss a (nested)
theoretical model that provides the basis for testable hypotheses about whether health
care providers quality discriminate. We then formalize the hypotheses and discuss
some issues in measuring quality. In following sections we discuss the data, which
consist of a cross-section of California primary care, outpatient clinics, present our
econometric methodology and discuss our empirical results. The paper concludes by
summarizing the implications of our findings and providing some suggestions for
future research.
MODELING PROVIDER BEHAVIOR WITH AND WITHOUT QUALITY
DISCRIMINATION
Consider a health care provider that services two distinct types of patients: those
carrying government-sponsored insurance (such as Medicare or Medicaid) and those
carrying privately-funded health insurance. It is conventional in the literature to
consider this a multiple-output producer in the health care market, whose output
can be measured as the number of patient encounters for each patient group2. For
simplicity, we assume that the government insurer reimburses the provider a fixed
fee for each service provided to a government patient, while the private insurer pays
the price for services set by the provider.3 Thus, the price the provider receives for
treating government patients is exogenous, while the price charged to private pa-
tients is under the control of the provider.
Following Newhouse [1970], the objective of a health care provider is to maxi-
mize its prestige. Prestige can take a number of forms, including profitability, ob-
taining grants and performing community service. We assume that prestige comes
from several sources: the number of patient encounters for each group (which may be
above the profit maximizing level of output, and so may contain excess “marketed
non-pecuniary goods”), quality for each patient group, profitability, purchasing/pro-
ducing non-marketed non-pecuniary goods4, and obtaining grants/donations.
Of primary importance in this paper is how we incorporate quality. We assume
that firms use quality to create or exploit market power, thus shifting the demand651 QUALITY DISCRIMINATION IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
curve for each patient group that it serves. What is unclear is whether providers do
not practice quality discrimination (so all patient groups receive the same level of
quality) or whether they offer different patient groups different levels of quality based
on the patient’s insurer. While standard (profit or utility maximizing) economic theory
predicts quality discrimination likely will occur if reimbursement differs across pa-
tient groups, ethical or legal restrictions (including, for example, JCAHO minimum
quality standards) might prevent providers from doing so.
 We assume that the provider has decided a priori whether or not to practice
quality discrimination, and that all quality levels meet or exceed the minimum stan-
dards established in the industry. In the event that the provider does practice quality
discrimination, there is no substantial legal penalty for doing so, or, if there is a
substantial penalty, the odds of being caught and punished by the government are
negligible5. While our model is sufficiently general to encompass both for-profit and
not-for-profit operating status, we assume that choice is predetermined.
Assuming that decisions to quality discriminate (or not to quality discriminate)
are a priori allows us to postulate two different models – one in which the provider
does not practice quality discrimination, and another in which the provider quality
discriminates. We can then compare the implications of each model, both jointly and
separately. We subsequently use this comparison to develop a set of empirically test-
able hypotheses that distinguishes the two practices.
Using the prestige configuration of Newhouse, we assume that the provider’s
objective function takes the following form:
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X1[p1,q1] is the quantity of privately insured patient encounters.
X2[q2] is the quantity of government-insured patient encounters.
p1 is the price the provider charges for treating a privately insured patient.
p2 is the price the provider recovers for treating a government patient.
q1 is the quality that a privately insured patient receives from the provider.
q2 is the quality that a government patient receives from the provider.
N is an excess, non-marketed non-pecuniary good (note that having multiple
N will give analogous results, so we use a single N for simplicity).
T is the firm’s tax obligation, which is set exogenously by the
government and may vary depending on the firm’s operating status.
C[q1X1, q2X2, N] is the provider’s total (variable) cost function.
G[q1X1, q2X2, N, T] is the provider’s total grant/donation function.
P is the firm’s (after tax) observed level of profit.
Notice that quality discrimination occurs when q1 differs from q2. Without quality
discrimination q1=q2 (which we can denote simply as q) and so the objective function
becomes652 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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With or without quality discrimination, a higher price for private patients lowers
their demand, and higher quality for those patients increases their demand for ser-
vices. Thus, we assume providers enjoy some degree of market power in the private
market place, exercising that power by choosing price, quality or both. Providers also
enjoy market power in the demand by government-funded patients. However, the
ability to exercise that market power is limited to quality. Since the government sets
the price per unit, the only way a provider can influence the demand for its services
by government-funded patients is to adjust the level of quality offered those patients.6
Quality is used as a weighting index, and we derive a “quality-adjusted” output by
multiplying a firm’s output by its quality. The value of this approach is that it shows
that a change in the level of quality will have a direct effect on a firm’s resource
constraint (i.e., the number of patients the firm is able to treat) as well as an indirect
effect on the number of patients willing to obtain treatment from the firm. By exam-
ining a firm’s quality-adjusted output (instead of a firm’s number of patient encoun-
ters), the dual effects of quality on a firm’s cost structure can be accounted for. The
presence of taxes in the grant/donation function is consistent with the fact that non-
profit firms (which have a different value for T than for-profit firms) are more likely
to receive external funding, particularly from government sources.
As noted above, we assume that quality discrimination is an a priori decision. It
is not endogenous because the decision is whether or not to violate legal, professional
and ethical standards. With the quality discrimination decision being made before
optimization, we can infer nested models – one where the quality offered the two
groups is the same and one where the quality differs.
The first step in deriving testable hypotheses about quality discrimination in-
volves finding the optimal decision rules by providers if they do or don’t discriminate
on quality. We assume that the demand, cost and utility functions all have normal
characteristics such that second-order necessary and sufficient conditions hold. More
precisely, the structure of the cost function is that employed by Dor and Farley [1996]
and Friesner [2003]. It is nonlinear and implicitly contains the possibility of both
economies of scale and economies of scope, without requiring the presence or absence
of either. Similarly, the complementarity and/or substitutability of utility across dif-
ferent quality-adjusted outputs are implicit, but not limited, by U{·}. Our results re-
quire one explicit behavioral assumption – that the marginal utility of grants differs
from the marginal disutility of cost. What this means is that grants in themselves
bring prestige, and serve a purpose beyond extending the productive capacities of the
provider. The effect of this assumption is that when the provider discriminates on
quality it acts as a revenue maximizer, reducing p1 and increasing q1 and q2 until
marginal revenue from each source equals zero.7 Thus the model implies
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Clearly, the quality discriminating firm does not cost shift or cost adjust.
When the provider does not quality discriminate the objective function is identi-
cal to the previous model except that now the firm provides only one quality level to
all patient groups so q1 = q2 = q. Using the same assumptions, we once again find that
the firm is a revenue maximizer with respect to p1 and quality, but this time it does
not differentiate between the quality offered government-insured patients and pa-
tients insured privately. The difference becomes that the choice of (a single) quality
now affects both X1 and X2 resulting in what is essentially summing (3) and (4) so we
have
(8) Xp X p 11 1 1 0 +=
(9) pX pX qq 11 22 0 +=
The key difference between the two models is given by a comparison of (9) to (3)
and (4). Instead of maximizing revenue separately (under quality discrimination),
the firm now maximizes revenue jointly. As a result, it is not necessarily the case
that each partial of demand is zero. Instead, the firm may go beyond revenue maxi-
mizing levels for one group (so that one of the partials is actually negative) in order to
maximize revenue for both groups.
Totally differentiate (8) and (9) to create comparative statics that describe the
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Only in rare cases would these comparative statics both be zero.10 Thus, when the
firm does not quality discriminate, it likely will cost shift and/or cost adjust. In both
equations, the denominators are positive (to ensure a maximum of the objective func-
tion). The sign of (10) is ambiguous because we do not know the sign of  X qp 1 1. If this
cross-partial is positive, or is sufficiently small and negative, then the sign of (10)
becomes non-negative, and the provider does not cost shift. Alternatively, a suffi-
ciently large (in magnitude) and negative value for this cross partial makes (10) nega-
tive, and the provider does practice cost shifting. The sign of (11) is unambiguously
nonnegative, and is zero only if demand by private pay patients is not affected by
price or quality does not affect demand for government paid patients – so we would
expect it to be positive, and thus expect that the provider cost adjusts.
Our findings, particularly (11), have important implications for policy as well as
for the cost adjusting literature, which has heretofore assumed that a firm’s decision
not to quality discriminate reduces (or possibly mitigates) its incentive to cost adjust.
Our findings present the opposite inference: failure to quality discriminate may ac-
tually encourage cost adjusting behavior, and not only for government patients. Pri-
vate pay patients are also affected.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES AND MEASURING QUALITY
A comparison of (5) – (7) to (10) and (11) provide a pair of testable hypotheses
concerning a firm’s quality discrimination activities. First, under the null hypothesis
that a firm does quality discriminate, one can regress the government price (as well
as other important exogenous factors) on private price, private quality and govern-
ment quality (where each quality measure is constructed solely based on data for
that group). If the null hypothesis is correct, then the coefficient estimates for the
government price (in each and all regressions) should not differ from zero with any
reasonable degree of statistical significance. Concomitantly, finding that the coeffi-
cient estimate is different from zero with the chosen level of statistical significance
leads us to reject this hypothesis. Note that to be consistent with our model the cost
adjusting equations (those dealing with quality) need to find a positive coefficient
estimate for government price, while the private price equation need only find a non-
zero coefficient estimate.
If we reject the null hypothesis (of quality discrimination), we can provide addi-
tional evidence of cost adjusting when firms do not quality discriminate by combin-
ing all government and privately-insured patients to create a single measure of qual-
ity offered by the firm. Then one can re-run the quality regressions with the “correct”
quality measure. If the regression produces a positive and significant coefficient esti-
mate, this would provide additional evidence of cost adjusting.
An issue always faced in empirical analyses of quality in health care is how to
measure quality. Since we have no direct measures of quality, we rely on the same
proxy as Dranove and White [1998] and Gertler [1989] — service intensity. We follow
Friesner [2003] and calculate a measure of service intensity based on a Lerner type










where i indicates each (non-charity) patient group, Enc represents patient encoun-
ters and Pat represents the number of patients for each group. This measures service
intensity as a type of contact ratio. A higher value indicates that a fewer number of
patients are visiting the clinic more often, and thus utilizing a greater share of the
clinic’s resources. A value of zero means that each patient is receiving the minimum
service intensity (1 visit) while as the index approaches 1, only a few patients are
utilizing the clinic’s services, indicating a high degree of service intensity.11
This measure, of course, may be skewed for clinics serving sicker populations, or
those with different demographics that might warrant more care – for example, a
higher proportion of pregnant patients may require more prenatal care, raising the
encounters per patient. Ideally, a case mix variable would be available for each clinic;
however, this was not so. We do control for the percentage of patients who are eld-
erly, and some racial characteristics, which helps control for case mix differences
correlated with those factors. But we are forced to (implicitly) assume that the aver-
age practice styles and “error rates” across clinics are sufficiently close that service
intensity is at least correlated with quality.
An additional drawback to this measure of service intensity is that it is bounded
between 0 and 1, and so is not directly employable as a dependent variable in stan-
dard (OLS) regression techniques. To avoid this difficulty, we transform our service
intensity measures by taking the z-scores. This newly transformed variable is ap-
proximately normally distributed (with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1),
and thus conducive to standard regression techniques.
DATA
The data used in this study are taken from the 2000 annual report of primary
care clinics provided by the California Office of Statewide Health Planning and De-
velopment. There are 744 primary care clinics in the state. Of these 744 clinics, 715
are licensed as community clinics, while the remaining 29 are licensed as free clin-
ics.12 The data contain information on the number of patients and patient encounters
for each of these clinics, further broken down by sources of payment, as well as total
charges and collections for each of these patient groups. In addition, the data contain
demographic information on each clinic’s clientele, including race, gender, age and
income. The data provide sufficient information to allow us to construct a Herfindahl
index of market power for each clinic (where the market is defined at the county
level).13
The data do not provide information on the input prices facing each clinic. For
instruments, we collected information on the average wage per job in each county
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ web site as a proxy for the price of labor. We
utilized the average valuation per unit on new, single unit home construction (per
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of Finance homepage). After eliminating observations due to missing or mis-mea-
sured data, we were left with a sample of 355 observations.14
Consistent with our models, we divided patients into one of three groups. Medi-
care and MediCal (California’s Medicaid program) patients, both of whom reimburse
on a fixed fee for service (and/or capitation basis), comprise our “government” patient
group. Similarly, all other (paying) patients besides those on Medicare and MediCal
comprise our non-government, or “privately-insured” group. Because our model dis-
tinguishes charity care (or non-paying) patients from those in the government and
privately-insured groups, we place all non-paying patients in a third group. These
patients, while not used in our empirical analysis, may be thought of as encompass-
ing (a portion of) the non-marketed non-pecuniary good viewed as valuable to the
organization. In any case, it is important to exclude these patients from our non-
government patient group, since including them may artificially reduce the net non-
government price, thereby biasing the regression estimates [Zwanziger et al 2000].
The net price for government patients was calculated as total collections for those
patients, divided by the number of patient encounters. The net price for non-govern-
ment patients was calculated analogously.
Table 1 contains the names and definitions of the variables used in the study and
the mean and standard deviation for each of these variables. On average, the clinics
have approximately 50 percent more non-government encounters, although they have
more than twice as many (on average) non-government patients. This provides some
initial insights about whether the firms in our sample are quality discriminating.
Since it is based on these two values, the base measure of service intensity for gov-
ernment patients is much higher than for non-government patients, indicating that
the former group receives higher quality. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test (a non-
parametric equivalent to the matched t-test) indicates that these average values are
significantly different at better than a 95% level of confidence.15 It remains to be seen
from the coming regression analyses whether this difference remains significant when
controlling for other exogenous determinants of price and quality.
An interesting difference is in the net price variables. The average net govern-
ment price exceeds the average net non-government price by almost 23 percent. It is
often thought that government prices are lower than non-government prices. How-
ever, these community and free clinics charge private pay patients according to a
sliding scale of ability to pay. An initial reaction is that this may cause some diffi-
culty in empirically assessing quality discrimination. If net private price were the
only dependent variable in our model it potentially would. However, two factors miti-
gate this hazard; our test depends on quality measures as well as price measures,
and the clinics set the sliding scale, so can still cost adjust. Thus, the sliding scale of
private pay patients should not be a problem, particularly as we control for poverty
levels in each clinic’s service area. In that respect, although the average wage in the
counties being served exceeds $35,000 and the average house price exceeds $200,000,
on average the clinics serve low income populations. Over 60 percent of the patients,
on average, have incomes below 100% of the poverty level, while less than 13 percent
enjoy incomes greater than 200% of the poverty level. Patients are predominantly
Hispanic (46%), while 8 percent are black and 4 percent are Asian. Clinics average657 QUALITY DISCRIMINATION IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
TABLE 1
Variable Names, Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev.
Output Variables
NGOVENC Non-government, non-charity care patient encounters 7922.02 10526.70
GOVENC Government (Medicare and MediCal) patient encounters 5250.83 6820.92
NONENC Charity care patient encounters 752.67 2348.90
NGOVPAT Non-government, non-charity care patients 2954.99 3652.75
GOVPAT Government (Medicare and MediCal) patients 1482.59 1926.55
NONPAT Charity care patients 227.36 746.27
Net Price Variables
NGPRICE Net price collected for treating non-government, 63.98 49.73
non-charity care patient encounters
GPRICE Net price collected for treating government patient encounters 78.43 45.43
Service Intensity Variables
SIGOV Service intensity provided to government patients under the 0.6573 0.1958
hypothesis of  quality discrimination
SINGOV Service intensity provided to non-government, non-charity care
 patients under the hypothesis of quality discrimination 0.5860 0.1905
SIBOTH Service intensity provided to government and non-government
patients under the hypothesis of no quality discrimination 0.6267 0.1748
QGOV Measure of government quality - equal to the z-score of SIGOV 0.0000 1.00
QNGOV Measure of non-government quality - equal to the z-score 0.0000 1.00
of SINGOV
QBOTH Measure of quality under the hypothesis of no quality
discrimination - equal to the z-score of SIBOTH 0.0000 1.00
Input Price and Market Characteristics
PCAPITAL Average price of capital in each county 203900.00 59245.70
WAGE Average wage in each county 35243.90 10162.90
PHERF Herfindahl index of market power 0.1499 0.1836
PBLACK Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are African-American 0.0832 0.1403
PHISP Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are Hispanic 0.4647 0.3184
PASIAN Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are Asian 0.0412 0.1121
PELDER Proportion of a clinic’s patients that are 65 or older 0.0574 0.1217
PLOWPOV Proportion of a clinic’s patients whose income is below 100% of 0.6081 0.2753
the poverty level
PUPPOV Proportion of a clinic’s patients whose income is above 200% of 0.1279 0.1740
the poverty level
PFMALE Proportion of a clinic’s patients who are female 0.6654 0.1927
Firm-Specific Dummy Variables
LICTYPE Dummy variable that gives a value of 1 if a clinic is a free 0.0197 0.1392
primary care clinic
HOMEDV Dummy variable that gives a value of 1 if a clinic provides 0.1183 0.3234
services to the homeless
LEGALDV Dummy variable that gives a value of 1 if a clinic provides 0.0282 0.1657
legal services
COMMEDDV Dummy variable that gives a value of 1 if a clinic provides 0.4761 0.5001
community education services
BILING Dummy variable that gives a value of 1 if a clinic provides 0.9239 0.2655
bilingual services
IMMUNDV Dummy variable that gives a value of 1 if a clinic provides 0.6056 0.4894
immunization  services
Number of Observations 355658 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
little market power (PHERF averages 0.15). The elderly comprise, on average, just
under 6 percent of the patient base, while over 66 percent of patients are female.
Most clinics provide immunization and bilingual services, about half do some com-
munity education, but less than 12 percent provide services to the homeless.
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
We estimate a reduced form system of equations consistent with our theoretical
models and testable hypotheses. Our first test operates under the null hypothesis
that firms, on average, practice quality discrimination. As such, we create separate
service intensity measures and specify the following regression equations to test that
hypothesis:
(12) NGPRICE GPRICE X ii j i
j
j
i =+ + +
= ∑ αα α ε 01
2
17
(13) QGOV GPRICE X ii j i
j
j
i =+ + +
= ∑ ββ β υ 01
2
17
(14) QNGOV GPRICE X ii j i
j
j
i =+ + +




where i indexes each observation, NGPRICE is the average net non-government price,
QGOV is our government quality proxy, QNGOV is our non-government quality proxy,
GPRICE is the average net government price per encounter, the X
js are exogenous
control variables, the αs, βs and γs are parameters to be estimated, while the εs, νs
and ωs are stochastic error terms with the usual assumptions. Statistically signifi-
cant estimates different from zero for α1, β1 and/or γ1 would cause us to reject this null
hypothesis, while estimates not significantly different from zero for all three of these
coefficients would lead us to fail to reject this null hypothesis.
If we reject the first hypothesis, we can go further by examining the direct conse-
quence of not quality discriminating with regard to cost adjusting. To do so, we create
a new proxy for quality that is inclusive of both government and non-government
patients (which we define as QBOTH). We then estimate another reduced form equa-
tion of the following form:
(15) QBOTH GPRICE X ii j i
j
j
i =+ + +




where the θs are parameters, the τs are stochastic error terms, and the remaining
terms are defined analogously to (12) – (14). If θ1 is positive and significant, then
firms, on average, are cost adjusting. If this coefficient estimate is insignificant from
zero, it indicates that firms are not cost adjusting, even if they do discriminate across
patient groups on quality.
Table 2 presents our regression results. The first three columns in this table can
be used to test our first hypothesis. Clearly, all three coefficient estimates for the659 QUALITY DISCRIMINATION IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
government price variable are positive and statistically significant at 95% or better.
Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of quality discrimination. Additionally, the posi-
tive and significant estimate for GPRICE in the non-government price equation also
indicates that these firms are not cost shifting.16
TABLE 2
Cost Shifting and Cost Adjusting Regression Results
Dependent Variable: NGPRICE QGOV QNGOV QBOTH
Variable Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio Coeff. T-ratio
Constant -10.8444 -0.54 0.0798 0.19 0.7081 1.66* 0.6279 1.50
Net Price Variable
GPRICE 0.2300 4.14 ** 0.0032 2.73** 0.0028 2.42** 0.0030 2.57 **
Input Price and Market Characteristics
PCAPITAL 0.0001 2.48 ** -0.000001 -0.97 -0.000001 -1.11 -0.000002 -1.48
WAGE -0.0006 -1.88 * 0.00001 1.96** 0.000007 1.02 0.000009 1.28
PHERF -18.7067 -1.28 0.4223 1.37 0.4431 1.44 0.4016 1.33
PBLACK -21.2510 -1.09 0.1738 0.42 0.8277 2.02** 0.9415 2.33 **
PHISP -11.3880 -1.24 -0.4168 -2.16** -0.4354 -2.25** -0.3116 -1.64
PASIAN 31.1626 1.35 -0.4118 -0.84 -1.1461 -2.35** -0.0433 -0.09
PELDER 26.7663 1.22 -1.4430 -3.12** -1.1521 -2.50** -1.2519 -2.76 **
PLOWPOV 4.2221 0.36 -0.1316 -0.52 -0.2025 -0.81 -0.0865 -0.35
PUPPOV 14.9161 0.81 -0.6887 -1.77* -0.7451 -1.92* -0.7295 -1.91 *
PFMALE 102.1900 7.37 ** -1.0762 -3.67** -1.4313 -4.89** -1.5824 -5.51 **
Firm-Specific Dummy Variables
LICTYPE -4.4814 -0.26 -0.2848 -0.78 -0.1908 -0.53 -0.3321 -0.93
HOMEDV -1.3507 -0.16 -0.3441 -1.98** -0.1979 -1.14 -0.2562 -1.51
LEGALDV 6.0613 0.37 1.0666 3.07** 0.9544 2.76** 1.1035 3.24 **
COMMEDDV -10.6521 -2.08 ** 0.1908 1.76* 0.1317 1.22 0.0812 0.76
BILING -7.7704 -0.78 0.2784 1.33 0.4270 2.04** 0.3748 1.83 *
IMMUNDV -6.1666 -1.16 0.3182 2.83** -0.0185 -0.16 0.1492 1.35
R-Square 0.2624 0.1860 0.1884 0.2116
Adjusted R-Square 0.2252 0.1450 0.1474 0.1770
F[17, 337] Statistic 7.05 ** 4.53** 4.60** 5.48 **
* indicates significance at the 10% level
** indicates significance at the 5% level
Having found evidence that these primary care clinics are not practicing quality
discrimination, we can go further to test whether and how these firms may be prac-
ticing cost adjusting. The final column in Table 2 presents these results. Of primary
interest is the sign and significance of the coefficient estimate for the government
price variable. It is clearly positive and significant at better than a 95% level of con-
fidence, indicating cost adjusting behavior.17 Not surprisingly, the impact of price
changes on quality is about the average of the individual impacts estimated under
the possibility that quality discrimination is practiced. It is comforting, and further
evidence of non-quality discrimination, that the coefficient on the combined data is
not significantly different from either of the estimates that come out of the regres-
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While not central to our analysis, the other control variables offer a few interest-
ing insights into the behavior of community clinics in California. Clinics with a larger
proportion of female patients set higher prices and offer lower service intensity than
do clinics with smaller proportions of female patients, holding the other regressors
constant. Service intensity is also lower in clinics with a higher proportion of its
population exceeding 200 percent of the poverty line, and with larger proportion of
the population being elderly. These findings are somewhat counterintuitive for sev-
eral reasons. If females use the clinics for prenatal care, we would expect more fre-
quent visits (service intensity). This could be countered by females coming to the
clinics for birth control services (which may explain the lower service intensity). That
elderly have lower service intensity is also difficult to explain, since they are more
likely to be covered by a government plan (in this case Medicare), and are more likely
to have chronic illnesses requiring periodic checking. One possible explanation is
that they are more likely than others to come for services like flu-immunizations
(once a year).18
Service intensity for non-government patients is higher when the clinic has a
larger proportion of black patients and lower when the proportion of Asian patients
increases. Clinics with higher proportions of Hispanic patients give lower service
intensity no matter what insurance coverage. This last finding may be a result of
language differences that may impede communication between the patients and pro-
viders. The statistically significant positive coefficient on bilingual services in the
non-government and total quality equations supports this conjecture. Finally, the
result that clinics that provide legal services have higher levels of quality might say
something about the clinic management. A willingness to extend beyond medical
care may be an indicator of greater sensitivity to the needs of the community, which
extends to the quality of care offered to patients.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Using what is essentially a nested model, we use service intensity to test for
quality differences among Community Clinics in California. Our empirical analysis
reveals no evidence of quality discrimination within this group of providers. To the
extent that an ethic calls for equal quality in health care regardless of the ability to
pay, this finding is comforting. From an economic perspective, however, it is not nec-
essarily efficient. Implicit in our model is an additional constraint on behavior (that
quality be equal across patients), which by its nature lowers the achievable optimum.
One disturbing finding in our study is that there is strong evidence that these
clinics practice cost adjusting. When payments by government agencies for care de-
creases, so does the quality or service intensity offered patients. Moreover, the cost
adjusting extends not just to patients supported by government programs like Medi-
care and Medicaid, but to private pay patients as well. Although it may be a result of
not discriminating on quality grounds, private pay patients should be concerned.
Policies designed to control the cost of government programs and instill efficiency
among providers may have adverse impacts on all patients. Thus, private pay pa-
tients who think lowering government payments for health care would have no effect661 QUALITY DISCRIMINATION IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
on them may, in fact, be mistaken. What is taken away from government-supported
patients is also taken away from them.
Our findings also present some recommendations for future research. One limi-
tation of our empirical analysis is that it utilizes only a single, service intensity-
based measure of quality. While using service intensity as a proxy for quality has its
precedent in the literature, it would be beneficial for future research to determine
whether these results are robust to alternative and/or multiple measures of quality;
most notably the process, structural and outcome-based quality measures proposed
by Donabedian (1980; 1988). Since health care quality is a multi-faceted variable, it
may be the case that firms are actually quality discriminating in the provision of
certain aspects of quality, but not others. Further research that identifies whether or
not such partial quality discrimination is occurring would provide a valuable contri-
bution to our knowledge of this phenomenon.
Another suggestion for research is to determine whether or not our findings are
robust to the choice of health care provider. It remains to be seen whether other types
of providers, such as hospitals and nursing homes, practice quality discrimination.
Hospitals, in particular, provide such a wide variety of medical services (and treat a
variety of different illness severities for each medical condition) that quality dis-
crimination becomes a much more viable possibility. For a policy perspective, then,
an extension of our work that studies these types of providers is of paramount con-
cern.
APPENDIX A
Deriving the Cost Adjusting/Cost Shifting Rules
We assume that the provider’s objective function takes the following form
(A1)   max , , , [ ], [ ]
,,, qqpN
Uq X qX N G p X p X G
121
1122 11 22 • {} =++ • ΠΠ , where  − −• − CT []
where the variables are as defined in the paper.
Quality discrimination occurs when q1 differs from q2. With or without quality
discrimination, the provider’s choice of private price and private quality influences
the private demand for its services. However, the only way the provider is able to
influence government demand is to adjust the level of quality offered those patients.
Differentiate the model by the a priori choice to quality discriminate (so q1 ≠ q2).
To simplify the optimization process, we substitute the expression for P into the util-
ity function and define the result as the function L(·). Taking partial derivatives, the
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The signs of the partial derivatives apply standard economic assumptions. For example,
costs and utility are increasing in service intensity-adjusted output. Any economies of663 QUALITY DISCRIMINATION IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
Appendix A — Continued
of scale and scope are implicitly included in C1 and C2. Similarly, complementarity
and/or substitutability in utility across different service intensity-adjusted outputs
are contained in U1 and U2. The sign of G3 is based on the assumption that N is
defined as community enhancing activities that are not distributed through a mar-
ket, such as charity care.
A change of variables facilitates deriving our testable hypotheses. Define V = G[·] – C[·].
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Totally differentiate (A6) – (A8) to create comparative statics that describe the firm’s
cost shifting and cost adjusting incentives.
When the provider does not quality discriminate the objective function is identical
to the previous model except that now the firm provides only one quality level to all
patient groups so q1 = q2 = q. We retain the same assumptions concerning the signs of
demand partials (particularly with respect to private price, as well as the second order
partials), marginal costs and marginal utilities. In addition, for each demand function,
higher quality still increases the quantity demanded. The problem now is
(A9)    max , , , [ ], [ ] [ ]
,, qp N
Uq X q X NG p X pX G C
1
12 1 12 2 • {} =++ • − • − ΠΠ where    T T
Since reimbursement differs across patient groups, the firm is still operating off of
two distinct demand curves. Substituting the expression for P into the utility func-
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, and similarly for the





, and use the result in (A10) and
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V
pX pX pX pX qq qq
The key difference between the two models is given by a comparison of (A14) to
(A7) and (A8). Instead of maximizing revenue separately (under quality discrimina-
tion), the firm now maximizes revenue jointly. As a result, it is not necessarily the
case that each partial of demand is zero. Instead, the firm may go beyond revenue
maximizing levels for one group (so that one of the partials is actually negative) in
order to maximize revenue for both groups.
Totally differentiate (A13) and (A14) to create comparative statics that describe
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Deriving the Comparative Statics in the Quality Discrimination Model
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Define the far left matrix as A. It follows that
(B2)
|A| =   2 11 1 11 1 2 2
11
11 1 11 1 2 2
11
Xp X Xp X p X
pX
pp p qq q q q
qp
+ ( ) + ( )( )−
( ) ) + ( )( ) Xp X p X qq pq q 11 1 2 2 11 12 2
which must be negative (since A is a 3x3 matrix) in order to guarantee that the
function is maximized. Note that, given (A7) and (A8), and assuming that both prices
are positive, this value simplifies to
(B2a)
|A| =   2 11 1 1 1 2 2
11 1
11 1 1 1 2 2
11
Xp X p X p X
pX pX
pp p q q q q
qp
+ ( )( )( )−
( ) θ 1 12 2
22 11 1 11 1
11 22
22 11 1 11 2
qp qq
qq qq p pp
pX
pX pX X pX p
( )( )







Equation (B2a) implies that in order for the function to be maximized, the following
condition must hold
(B3) pX pX X pX qp qq p pp 11
2
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where |A1| is the determinant of the matrix A, except that the first column in this













⎥ Xd p q

















where |A2| is the determinant of the matrix A, except that the second column in this
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where |A3| is the determinant of the matrix A, except that the third column in this
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However, assuming that p2 > 0, (A8) requires that  X q 2 2 0 = , making the expression
in (B7) also equal to zero.
Deriving the Comparative Statics in the Non-Quality Discrimination Model
We begin by totally differentiating (A13) – (A14) and placing the results in matrix form
(B8)
2 11 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1 2 2
11 1 1
1
Xp X X p X
Xp X p X p X
d pp p q p q




























Define the far left matrix as B. It then follows that
(B9) |B| =   2 11 1 1 12 2 1 1 1
2
11 1 1 Xp X p Xp X X p X pp p q q q q q q p + ( ) + ( )−+ ( )
which must be positive in order to guarantee that the function is maximized. Apply-
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1. Dranove and White based their theory on the arguments of Gertler (1988; 1989). Gertler’s model
assumes that the provider always operates at full capacity, thereby allowing the researcher to treat
total output (and hence all demand elasticities) as exogenous. While this may be true of nursing homes
(which Gertler studied), this is not the case for most other health care producers, including the sample
of hospitals employed by Dranove and White.
2 . It is assumed that the provider has significant market power over private price as well as any type of
quality offered by the firm.
3. We assume that government-insured patients pay a co-pay that is negligible and/or unrelated to the
value of services rendered by the provider  and that privately insured patients pay a co-pay that is
proportional to the charges set by the provider. Private payers may pay a discounted percentage of
billed charges (or self-pay patients may pay 100% of billed charges), but that does not change the
model or its conclusions. As many private insurers are adopting reimbursement policies that are
similar to those of Medicare and/or Medicaid  one need only re-define the government group to
include these patients, and adapt the empirical analysis accordingly. For ease of exposition, we
maintain the government-private nomenclature.
4. Some studies have included charity care as an excess non-marketed, non-pecuniary expenditure (for
example, Friesner and Rosenman (2002) and Hassan et al (2000)). In this study, one may also define
excess non-marketed non-pecuniary spending in this way. However, since neither the quantity nor
the quality of charity care is distributed through a market-based mechanism, we will not distin-
guish between the quality and quantity of charity care services. As such, our test of quality discrimi-
nation will be based solely on those services that are distributed through a market mechanism.
5. Asymmetric information and the fact that quality is a multi-faceted, unobserved variable makes
this assumption innocuous.
6. Quality, of course, is difficult to measure. In the empirical section we use service intensity as our
(imperfect) measure of quality (Gertler, 1989). We assume, however, in the theoretical analysis,
that quality is seen by the patient and affects demand. To ease the exposition, our theoretical analy-
sis  assumes that casemix is held constant. It is possible that providers could also discriminate on
casemix.    If one wishes to examine quality and case-mix simultaneously, one can apply Dor and
Farley’s (1996) approach to this model with little loss of generality.
7. The mathematics behind this assertion is provided in appendix A.
8. Cost shifting is an alternative to cost adjusting when the provider can raise net prices to patients over
whom it exercises price control. The firm’s cost shifting incentive is consequently given by equation
(5). For a more detailed discussion of cost shifting, see Dranove and White (1998), Zwanziger et al
(2000), Rosenman et al (2000) and Rosenman and Friesner (2002). In this paper, our primary empha-
sis is on the quality incentives of the provider. But since cost shifting and cost adjusting are linked
(Dranove and White, 1998; Rosenman and Friesner, 2002) we provide this comparative static for the
sake of completeness. A derivation of these comparative statics can be found in appendix B of this
paper.
9. A derivation of these comparative statics can also be found in appendix B of this paper.
10. An interesting exception to this finding is when the firm maximizes joint revenue by setting both
cross-partials equal to zero. In that case, the signs of (10) and (11) are zero. As such, the pair of669 QUALITY DISCRIMINATION IN OUTPATIENT CLINICS
hypothesis tests we are about to present are sufficient (but not necessary) tests of quality discrimina-
tion.
11. Since quality is inherently unobservable, our service intensity measures almost certainly measure
quality with error. However, since we will be utilizing these measures as dependent variables in re-
gression analyses via OLS, this should not be of significant concern, since measurement error of the
dependent variable will not affect the consistency of our regression estimates (Greene, 2000).
12. This data set was chosen primarily because it consists of a group of nonproprietary health care provid-
ers that are primarily interested in serving the needs of the public. Thus, at least a priori, these
providers should be least likely to practice quality discrimination. If we do find evidence of quality
discrimination, our findings present a very serious policy issue. Alternatively, if we do not find empiri-
cal evidence of quality discrimination, the data will allow us to go further to examine the consequences
of not quality discriminating, particularly with regard to cost adjusting. An additional reason for
choosing this group of clinics is that they provide a very basic set of services to the public. As a result,
differences in patient illness severity across providers may not be a significant concern.
13. One issue to address is whether or not private practice physicians should be included in the Herfindahl
index of competition. Community Clinics are operated by tax-exempt nonprofit corporations supported
in whole or in part by donations, bequests, gifts, grants, government funds or contributions. Any
charges to the patient are based on the patient’s ability to pay. Free Clinics are operated by a tax
exempt non-profit corporation supported in whole by voluntary donations, bequests, gifts, grants, gov-
ernment funds or contributions. Patients are not charged. These organizations comprise a critical
element of the California safety net. They provide health care to about 2.3 million people annually.
People use these clinics primarily because they lack insurance or because the clinics provide multi-
lingual and culturally appropriate care (CHHSA, 2002). The nature of these clinics and the popula-
tions they serve separates them from the market served by private practice physicians.
14. Of the 744 clinics in the data set, 108 did not report any data for the full year and, thus, could not be
included. Of the remaining 636 observations, 281 were excluded because they a) treated only one type
of patient group (thus leaving no possibility of quality discrimination) or b) missing or inconsistent
data rendered the observation unreliable. We compared the excluded observations to those we used for
the mix of patients (government or private), prices charged, demographic characteristics and service
intensities. An ANOVA indicated that the only significant differences between the two groups were in
the number of government patients seen (the sample used included firms who treated slightly more
MediCal patients), in non-government prices (the included sample were paid slightly more), and the
percent of low poverty clients and Asians (included sample lower in both).
15. The test (which takes the difference between non-government and government service intensities)
gives a test statistic equal to –9.985, which is statistically significant at better than a 99% level of
confidence. We also conducted a (nonparametric) sign test for median differences between non-govern-
ment and government service intensities. The test indicated that, of the 355 firms, 270 had higher
government service intensity measures, 83 exhibited higher non-government service intensity mea-
sures, and 2 had identical service intensity values. These values were sufficient to reject the null
hypothesis of no median difference (with a test statistic of – 9.90) at better than 99% confidence.
16. Rosenman et al (2000) used a sample of California primary care clinics from an earlier year (1995)
and found evidence of cost shifting . However, they did not separate charity care patients from non-
government patients. As mentioned above, this may bias the results by artificially reducing the net
non-government price.
17. Friesner (2003) found a similar result using a sample of California outpatient clinics from an earlier
time period (1995).
18. We would like to thank a referee for helping with these possible explanations.
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